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THE FINAL PHASE OF THE INSULAR TARIFF
CONTROVERSY.
It has been decided that after the ratification of the treaty with
Spain our new possessions were domestic territory, and therefore
import duties under our own tariff against foreign countries should
not be levied on articles arriving here from Porto Rico and the
Philippines.' It was also decided as a correlative to the De Lima
case that while, prior to ratification, duties levied by the military
government in Porto Rico were valid, after that date those duties
fell because the United States and Porto Rico were no longer for-
eign to each other.! Notwithstanding these determinations, it was
held that Congress might, by specific enactment, constitutionally
lay import duties upon merchandise brought into this country from
such territory, although domestic.!
The ultimate stage in this aspect of our insular relations has
now been reached by the presentation of cases to the Supreme
Court which raise the issue of the validity of the tariff imposed
in the Philippine Islands by our military and civil authorities
upon imports from the United States (as well as the rest of
the world) during the period between the ratification of the treaty
and the specific approval and re-enactment of that tariff by Congress.
On the one hand the claimants, trading houses engaged in business
between this country and the East, have contended that the duties
collected were invalid; that the territory being domestic, commerce
with the United States must be free; that although there was an
insurrection in the Philippines requiring the use of force to suppress,
the war power under the Constitution was not involved and there
was no such military necessity as to justify the imposition of a tariff
against the products of this country; and, finally, that the point is
completely ruled by the decisions in De Lima v. Bidwell, Dooley v.
United States and the Fourteen Diamond Rings Case. The Gov-
ernment position is that this case is plainly to be distinguished from
i. DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. r; Pefike v. United States (Fourteen
Diamond Rings Case), 183 U. S. z76.
2. Dooley v.. United States, 183 U. S. IS'; the Foraker Act, 31 Statutes
at Large of the U. S. 77.
3 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
the previous adjudications; that a flagrant state of war prevailed
during the whole period in question, the war power was involved
and military necessities existed; and that this situation does not
present a correlative to the Diamond Rings Case as the Dooley case
was the correlative of the De Lima case; that, since Congress ap-
proved the executive action, Downes v. Bidwell controls.
The general question is of national concern and reaches far beyond
the mere legality of the tariff exactions which occasioned the inquiry.
The full competence and independence of the war power are in-
volved. It is true that in the Diamond Rings Case the Government
urged the prevalent state of war as a reason why the territory
should be considered foreign with respect to our own tariff law,
although sovereignty, title and possession had passed from Spain
by the treaty. Peace was not attained, possession was sharply
challenged and therefore, it was argued in that case, the territory
was not only hostile in fact but was foreign in point of law so far as
our tariff was concerned and duties were properly imposed here
on importations from the Philippines. But the court thought other-
wise, and held that notwithstanding the insurrection, the legal title
and possession of the United States remained unaffected and the
territory was domestic. In the present case, however, the effect of
the insurrection as a factor becomes real and acute. It concerns
now, not the character of the country as domestic respecting our
tariff under the Dingley law despite the state of war, but its condition
as hostile, although domestic, respecting the local duties which the
Executive deemed necessary to exact on imports from this country
as well as the rest of the world. The question, therefore, is whether
in that situation the war power was constitutionally invoked and
exercised and what was embraced within its scope.
The revolt in the Philippines was not a feeble insurrection; it was
settled and serious rebellion. So far as duration and extent are con-
cerned, it was civil war. The existence of the nation was not at
stake as in the War of the Rebellion, and it was not civil war, per-
haps, because a new people who had just come under our sovereignty
turned against us their previous rebellion against Spain as soon as
they realized we would not be complaisant' As our authorities
appear to have viewed the matter, it was a situation not unfamiliar
in various parts of the tropics-a determined attempt at revolution
by a group of clever and selfish men seeking their own ends in the
'For distinctions see section io, Lieber's Instructions for the Govern-
ment of Armies in the Field; the Prize Cases, 2 BI., 635, 666.
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name of the people and under' the guise of the sacred watch-words
"liberty and independence." The war lasted three years. The
insurrecto troops were well organized and disciplined. Tens of
thousands of soldiers were serving on each side; thousands of them
were killed or died of wounds; there were hundreds of engagements.
The warfare lulled at one time after repeated open encounters, and
our commanders then thought the end was near, but the conflict was
renewed and maintained as a systematized guerilla warfare until it
died out in sporadic instances of brigandage. Although there were
encouraging statements in annual messages and reports of the Execu-
tive as to the progress of our arms and the gradual extension of our
civil government, there can be no doubt that both the President and
Congress realized and determined that a state of war prevailed and
that the exercise of the war power was necessary.
The course of the Executive and legislative action was as follows:
In July, 1898, an executive order' imposed duties, which through all
the succeeding and minor modifications was substantially the pre-
existing Spanish tariff with the preferences to Spain stricken out.
The treaty was ratified ,kpril II, 1899.0 The Executive continued
the collection of the military tariff after the treaty was ratified, as
before, first by the military authorities and then, in part, by the
civil authorities after the commission assumed the legislative func-
tions of government and shared in the civil administration.: The
'so-called "Spooner Amendment"' was a resolution incorporated in
an appropriation act and provided that "all military, civil and
judicial powers necessary to govern in the Philippine Islands . .
'The language of the order is: "By virtue of the authority vested in
me as Commander in Chief . . . I do hereby order and direct
that, upon the occupation and possession of any ports and places in the
Philippine Islands by the forces of the United States, the following tar-
iff of duties and taxes, to be levied and collected as a military contri-
bution . . . shall take effect and be in force."
030 Stat., p. 1754.
'Instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission, April
7, i9oo (I Pub. Laws Philippine Com., p. lxiii):
"1 . . .the authority to exercise . . that part of the power
of government in the Philippine Islands which is of a legislative nature
is to be transferred from the military governor of the islands to this
commission . . . . until the establishment of the civil central
government for the islands . . . or until Congress shall otherwise
provide." The Commission on September 17, i9oi, exercising authority
under the instructions and the Spooner Amendment, infra, reenacted
the military tariff to take effect November 15, go (i Pub. Laws Philip-
pine Com., p. 581).
'Act of March 2, igoi (31 Stat., 895, 91o).
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shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person
and persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President
of the United States shall direct." In March, i9O2, Congress spe-
cifically enacted that the tariff act of the Philippine Commission
"shall be and remain in full force and effect," and that there shall be
levied upon all articles coming into the Philippines from the United
States the same duties which are required on articles from foreign
countries. In July, I9o2, the military government totally ceased
and the civil government took its place. The President proclaimed
the end of the war and amnesty, and Congress ratified the action of
the President in creating and empowering the Commission, ap-
proved, ratified and confirmed the Philippine tariff order and its
subsequent amendments, and recognized the insurrection as existing
up to that date.1 On September 8, I9o2, the Commission, in accord-
ance with the requirement of the act of Congress of July I, relative
to taking a census, formally certified that "a condition of general
and complete peace has been established."
The power of an executive government in the field is very abso-
lute. It may totally forbid all commercial intercourse or restrict it;
It may exact military contributions to defray the expenses of war
and to provide for the civil administration of the country on behalf
of the peaceful inhabitants. The Executive may impose dues and
charges as a condition for trading with hostile territory. Importa-
tion under such circumstances is not a right, but a privilege which
may be exercised only upon the conditions imposed. These doc-
trines apply equally to foreign and civil wars, and the cases arising
during our Civil War fully sustain them.'
It was said in the Prize Cases that while the President has no
power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or
a domestic State, he is authorized to suppress insurrection and is
bound to meet war in the shape presented without waiting for Con-
gress to baptize it with a name; that it is anomalous to contend that
a war levied by rebels in order to destroy a government is not a war
because it is an insurrection; that in a domestic as well as a foreign
war the belligerent party who claims to be sovereign may exercise
9. Act of March 8. z602 (32 Stat. 54).
io. Act of July , 1go92, Secs. x, 2, 6; 32 Stat. 691.
xi. 2 Halleck Int. Law, 445-449; Aatthews v. McStea, 93 U. S. 7; r
Kent's Com., 66; x Halleck Int. Law, 527; U. S. r'. Grossmayer, 9 Wall. 72;
Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; McKee v. U. S., 8 Wall. z63; The Prize
Cases, 2 B1. 635; Hamilton v. Dillin, 2r Wall. 73; The Reform, 3 Wall. 617;
The Sea Lion, 5 Wall. 630; The Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall. 521; Copjoell vt.
Hall, 7 Wall. 542; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404.
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both belligerent and sovereign rights. In Hamilton v. Dillin (note
II) the determinations were to the same effect, and, in particular
that the war power vested in the Government implied the right to
suspend or license commercial intercourse without any specific men-
tion of it in the Constitution. It was not necessary to decide in that
case that in the absence of Congressional action the power of per-
mitting intercourse with an enemy under restriction may be exercised
by the President alone, but it was said that little doubt could be
raised on the subject The license to trade there took the form of
what was called a bonus, rather than a tax, upon the shipment of
cotton from insurrectionary districts to the loyal States. Con-
gress passed a prior act which was held to authorize the executive
action, and passed a subsequent act which approved and confirmed
it. The view thus was, substantially, that in all three aspects the
executive course was valid: as an exercise of the war power clearly
within its sole competence, or under an authority in advance which
Congress had the right to give, or under a subsequent ratification
which was also within the power of Congress. The bonus or tax
was a condition legitimately imposed by the Government upon traffic
with hostile territory; no one was bound to accept it; no compul-
sion was exercised; the claimants had placed themselves in an
entirely voluitary position and were not entitled to recover. Mani-
festly, unless such claims are determined to be valid, and the exer-
cise of the war power, therefore, invalid and unconstitutional, there
can be no notion of a vested right which a later enactment by
Congress, undertaking to ratify the executive action, cannot defeat.
This case (Hamilton v. Dillin) and another Civil War case held
that a particular place in the hostile country was none the less hostile
because it was occupied by us in firm possession or was within our
military lines. A condition of hostility remains impressed upon all
the insurrectionary region until it is authoritatively removed at the
close of the war. That condition is not removed as to particu lar
individuals and places merely because, and as fast and as far as, our
armies succeed in occupying insurgent territory.
These doctrines of the Civil War cases were nevertheless earnestly
challenged in the pending Philippine cases, and it was urged that
since Manila was the headquarters of our military government and
its civil agencies, and was, almbst from the beginning of the insur-
rection, under our firm control, open to the commerce of the world,
it could not, being domestic territory, be regarded as belligerent and
12. Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187.
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hostile so as to justify the duties against the United States. These
exactions were (it was claimed) clearly outside the military -necessi-
ties of the case. It was argued on the authority of text books on
international law that only domestic territory occupied by rebels,
whose belligerency has been recognized, can be regarded as foreign,
and emphasis was laid upon the fact that our own courts had deter-
mined this territory to be domestic notwithstanding the prevailing
insurrection. Now, it was said in illustration by the -Supreme court
in the Dooley case (ante), that it could hardly be contended that a
Northern commander occupying a Southern port during our Civil
War could levy duties upon imports from the Northern States; that
his power would not extend beyond the necessities of the case, and
the claimants laid much stress upon this indication of the court's
view.
If,. however, despite the doctrines laid down as to the Civil War,
the particular place is not to be considered hostile providing we have
firm control there, then the logic necessarily means that the domestic
port or place is not hostile or in enemy territory unless the enemy
occupies and controls, which is a reductio ad absurditm, for in that
case our commander could not impose conditions or levy duties at all.
Nor does it seem likely that we must be challenged by street barri-
cades in order to give the Executive full military jurisdiction. And
the illustration from the Dooley case suggests on its face the very
exception here, viz: a necessity when actual war prevails, which
necessity can only be determined by the Executive as commander in
the actual, critical situation. For, take the case of a Southern port
occupied by our forces during the Civil War, as New Orleans was
occupied and administered as a municipality under oiur military
authorities from 1862 until the close of the war,--suppose, because
of wide-spread and intense feeling for the rebellion, an active propa-
gandism going on between native and foreign sympathizers within
and the hostile forces without, all kinds of correspondence and aids,
banking and trading agencies on behalf of the Confederacy,--it was
deemed necessary by our commander to place an absolute embargo
upon all commerce with New Orleans except from the surrounding
country and under strict supervision through the military lines. It
is quite certain that the power totally to forbid intercourse is lodged
with the commander in war; that he must determine the necessity.
and that the courts will not conjecture what were his motives and
reasons and pass upon the degree of the necessity.' If this is a
13. Hamilton v. Dillin, ut sup., p. 9i. Such considerations and conjec-
tures are not material.
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legitimate and essential element of the law of war, it seems certain
that a measure short of absolute resf-iction, a limited intercourse,
would be valid, and therefore that a levy of duties upon all mer-
chandise arriving by sea from the United States as well as foreign
countries would be within the military power. That is to say,
within the rule and illustration in the Dooley case the validity of the
particular measure depends on the nature and necessities of the
case, and the military commander must determine what a real crisis
demands. Of course it is notorious that under the apparent peace
at Manila, sedition, plotting and all kinds of correspondences with the
insurgent forces were going on; the customs tariff and port admin-
istration were very effective means of supervision and control. The
situation is typified by the fact that Aguinaldo's declarations of
independence and war were posted beside the proclamations of our
own commanders in the streets of Manila. Nor will it do to say
that we could do all that was done except levy duties on merchandise
from the United States. For purposes of revenue and strategy
alike those duties may have been the most important. If they were
not imposed, the Island government might have lost all; for we are
and were under treaty stipulation to admit Spanish ships and cargoes
on the same terms as our own, and then other powers would cer-
tainly have invoked "the most favored nation clause."
It is essential, indeed, to remember the distinction between cap-
tured territory and hostile territory. Undoubtedly we could impose
a blockade during war and would not pass a merchant vessel of our
own, with a cargo of domestic production, through its lines. Block-
ade is a usual means of reduction bello flagrante; embargo is
the exact equivalent when war is imminent or merely threatening,
or during actual peace at home, when it is imposed for reasons of
commercial necessity to meet aggressions upon neutral rights and
protect those rights by retaliation. It seems natural to conclude that
if a port is taken, we could maintain an embargo after capture during
hostilities, just as much as under complete peace, and exclude domes-
tic commerce then also if the executive authorities deemed that
necessary. Certainly the Executive can proceed thus if Congress
authorizes and approves. The inevitable inference is that if an
emergency does not extend so far, but nevertheless exists, a fortiori
we can do a less rigorous thing than establish blockade or embargo,
viz.: impose duties and embrace domestic as well as foreign
shipments.
These were the two contentions as to the intermediate authority
conferred and the final ratification by Congress (the "Spooner
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Amendment" and the act of July I, 1902, ante), viz: that, on the
one hand, the power exercised by the President was legislative, valid
until ratification of the treaty, thereafter invalid; that Congress can-
not delegate legislative power to the Executive, and cannot subse-
quently ratify what it cannot authorize in advance. The contrary
view is that the case is within the maxim that every subsequent rati-
fication has a retroactive effect and is equivalent to a prior mandate."
The law is well settled, and the test is: does the legislative body
which ratifies possess authority to do the act or to confer power todo it, in the first instance?' Here the question is, did Congress
possess authority, after ratification of the treaty, to impose duties
on goods entering the Philippine Islands from the United States?
The answer must, of course, be in the affirmative' The logic is
this: the President validly acted or legislated up to the ratification;
then Congress might have approved this action or legislation, pre-
viously valid, as continuing in force; and, authorizing later and
ratifying finally, this action of Congress relates back with the same
force and effect under the rule as a previous authority. The Presi-
dent continued to do something under his own previous legislation(if it were legislation), and Congress merely said, "Go on and do
this," and finally declared, "What you have done is right." There
was no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Where
Congress might have accomplished the result by its legislation, it
can ratify by legislation what was done without legislation other
than the originally valid executive order. The legislative approval
turned the valid power of the Executive to legislate, up to the date
of ratification, into the equally valid power to continue to execute
thereafter. The stress of the Civil War brought a plain determina-
tion of the point, without so much dialectics, as follows:
Whatever view may be taken as to the precise boundary betweenthe legislative and executive powers in reference to the question under
consideration, there is no doubt that a concurrence of both affords
ample foundation for any regulations on the subject.'
14. Omnis ratiabijo retrotrahitur et mandato equifiaratur.
iS. Marsh v. Fulton Co., io Wall. 676; Norton v. Shelby Co., xi8 U. S.451; Sykes v. Mayor, 55 Miss. 137; Grenada Co. v'. Brogden, xi2 U. S. 261;Brown v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 239; State v. Torinus, 26 Minn. i; McMillen v.Boyles, 6 Ia. 304; Mfattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687; ahom-
son v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327; SujOervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772; Gelfcke vt.City oJ Dubuque, I Wall. 175; Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, 8 Wh. 338; Cooley,
Const. Lim., 37r.
16. Downes v'. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244.
17. Hamilton vz. Dillin, ut sufi., p. 88.
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In short, argument for the public side may be stated syllogistically
as follows:
i. The start is with the war power and an imperative necessity
for its exercise. That authority cannot be trammeled and must itself
determine reasons, degree of necessity and what particular measures
or compulsions are required. The courts will not usurp that func-
tion.
2. The De Lima case simply determined that Porto Rico was
domestic territory respecting our tariff. The war power was not
involved.
3. The Dooley case decided that subsequent to ratification the
military tariff was not valid, because we had title and possession and
there was no military necessity. The war power was not involved,
but the door was left open in case it were.
4. The Diamond Rings case held that the Philippines were do-
mestic territory, notwithstanding the insurrection, in respect to the
legal elements of title and possession; that on this test duties levied
here were invalid. Our own tariff was involved; the war power was
not involved.
5. In the present cases the military tariff of the Philippines and
paramount war necessities are presented. The war power is in-
volved, and this issue is not the correlative of the Diamond Rings
case as the Dooley case is the correlative of the De Lima case.
6. Under Downes v. Bidwell Congress might have continued the
Philippine tariff including duties on merchandise entering from the
United States, on April II, 1899, as it did in March, 1902. It is
always well for the executive and legislature to concur in such
emergencies, although it may not be constitutionally necessary. If
it were, in this case Congress did by the statutes of March, 9oi, and
March and July, 19o2, accomplish as of the earlier date what it
might have accomplished on the earlier date. It acted nunc pro tunc
and ratified with the effect of a previous authority or previous act of
its own.
Speaking from the broad standpoint of public interest and national
capacity, it might well appear to the mind of any patriotic citizen
that if the Executive cannot legally do what was done, when we are
at war and the necessities are so vital, and if the joinder and approval
of Congress have no effect, then we are indeed impotent as a nation.
The constitutional authorities who act, the President and Congress,
are acting together and in harmony, yet before a rebellion may be
effectively suppressed and anarchy certainly averted, all details of
revenue and administration must be referred back to Congress ten
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thousand miles away, in session only a portion of the time; formal
war must be declared and every step must be prescribed and author-
ized by a statute in advance. Our safety and ability to prevent
calamity, to maintain our rights and perform our duties, national
and international, were at stake. It is not arguing from incon-
venience or hypothetical calamities to say that whether we choose or
not, we may be in a similar situation again. Where there are two
possible constructions, one producing absurd and pernicious results,
that one is to be avoided if consistent with reason. It is difficult
to believe that the Constitution was intended to leave the national
power in war and great emergencies so helplessly cramped and
bound, or that it will be construed, in the settled interpretation of the
law, to have that result.
In the final survey, on untechnical tests, in plain sense and reason,
the question is whether the Executive and Congress did what was
right; whether the demand to recover duties, voluntarily paid as a
condition of trading with hostile territory, presents a just claim. The
solemn inquiry now before the Supreme court is this: they are to
determine whether, when the nation is struggling with war, is sur-
rounded with difficulties and perils, the courts will assume to say
that the combined action of the Executive and legislative went beyond
the necessities, although there was no tyrannical aggression, no
violation of sacred guaranties. The question of the scope of the war
power, once involved the very existence of the Government, and may
do so again.
Henry M. Hoyt.
